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he hiring and firing decisions of individual 
businesses are one of the drivers behind 
movements in the unemployment rate during 
expansions and recessions. Whether a 
recession is driven by large job losses or weak hiring will 
greatly affect the composition and consequences of the 
unemployed and can have important policy implications. 
The extent to which recessions are times of weak hiring 
or high job loss depends in large part on the severity of 
the downturn. A recession is a time when the fraction of 
businesses that are expanding goes down and the fraction 
of businesses that are contracting goes up. A severe 
recession is one in which the shift in this distribution is 
more dramatic. In this article, Jason Faberman discusses 
how the severity of a recession determines whether high 
job loss or weak hiring will be the more important source 
of declining employment and rising unemployment 
through disproportionate changes in the distribution of 
business-level employment growth. 
What drives movements in the 
unemployment rate during expansions 
and recessions? Obviously, much of it 
is driven by the hiring and firing deci-
sions of individual businesses. When 
businesses hire more workers than 
they lose (whether those workers leave 
voluntarily or involuntarily), employ-
ment expands and the unemployment 
rate tends to go down. When busi-
nesses lose more workers than they 
hire, employment contracts and the 
unemployment rate rises. This does 
not mean, though, that boom times are 
driven entirely by hiring and reces-
sions are driven entirely by job losses. 
For example, if firms cut back sharply 
on their hiring with little change in 
the number of workers they lose, the 
unemployment rate would rise because 
people would find it harder to find new 
work.
Whether a recession is driven 
by large job losses or weak hiring will 
greatly affect the composition and 
consequences of the unemployed and 
can therefore have important policy 
implications. Laid-off workers can 
come from a variety of backgrounds. 
Oftentimes, these workers lose valu-
able human capital in the process, 
especially if the laid-off employees 
are older, more experienced workers 
with a lot of job-specific skills. Weak 
hiring affects all individuals looking 
for work: those who were recently laid 
off, those just entering the workforce 
(e.g., recent graduates), and those who 
are currently employed but want a new 
job. Weak hiring implies that there are 
fewer jobs to apply for, which makes it 
more difficult for the unemployed to 
find work.
The recessions of the 1970s and 
1980s, as well as the most recent 
downturn, saw steep declines in 
employment and sharp increases in 
unemployment. At the same time, 
the pace of layoffs was very high but 
relatively short-lived. In comparison, 
the fall in employment and the rise in 
unemployment during the 1990-91 and 
2001 recessions were much less severe. 
During these recessions, there was a 
moderate rise in job losses but a rela-  Business Review  Q2  2010   17 www.philadelphiafed.org
tively steep drop in hiring, particularly 
during the 2001 recession. Further-
more, the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions 
had declines that persisted well after 
the official end of the recession.1
In academic circles, the contrast 
in behavior has led to two diverging 
views on recessions and the labor mar-
ket. Some economists, such as Robert 
Hall and Robert Shimer, focus on the 
more recent downturns and take the 
view that rising unemployment during 
recessions is driven by weak hiring and 
hence a low probability that the un-
employed will  find a job. Others, such 
as Shigeru Fujita and Garey Ramey, 
and Michael Elsby, Ryan Michaels, and 
Gary Solon, cite the historical evi-
dence and argue that rising unemploy-
ment is driven by high rates of job loss.
In reality, the extent to which 
recessions are times of weak hiring or 
high job loss depends on the severity 
of the downturn. Severe recessions 
are typically characterized by a sharp 
drop in output and large amounts of 
job loss, while moderate recessions 
are characterized by smaller declines 
in output and relatively weak hiring. 
These results come about because, at 
any point in time, there is a distribu-
tion of businesses that are expanding, 
contracting, or keeping their employ-
ment steady. A recession is a time 
when the fraction of businesses that 
are expanding goes down and the frac-
tion of businesses that are contracting 
goes up. A severe recession is one in 
which the shift in this distribution is 
more dramatic. Furthermore, when 
businesses expand or contract by a 
certain amount, they tend to do so 
with a fairly consistent mix of hiring, 
quits (voluntary worker separations), 
and layoffs (involuntary worker separa-
tions). Fast-growing businesses tend 
to have mostly hires, fast-declining 
businesses tend to have mostly layoffs, 
and businesses with smaller employ-
ment changes tend to have a mix of 
hiring, quits, and layoffs that occur 
simultaneously. During a severe reces-
sion, the number of businesses with 
large contractions increases sharply. As 
a result, the layoff rate at the national 
level increases drastically. In contrast, 
a mild recession generally has a smaller 
increase in the number of contracting 
businesses, so the resulting drop in hir-
ing at the national level can outweigh 
the more modest rise in the layoff rate. 
HIRES, SEPARATIONS, AND 
BUSINESS GROWTH
The Difference Between Gross 
and Net Employment Changes. To 
understand how the above findings 
come about, we need to start with 
the basic fact that the net change in 
employment that we observe from the 
Employment Situation Report of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) each 
month is the result of literally millions 
of workers either starting or leaving a 
job at thousands of businesses.2
We can examine gross changes in 
employment in two ways: by tracking 
the movements of the workers or by 
tracking the employment behavior 
of the businesses that employ them. 
Shigeru Fujita details the first ap-
proach in an earlier Business Review 
article, and he shows that following the 
flow of workers between employment, 
unemployment, and nonparticipa-
tion in the labor force provides much 
more information on the state of the 
labor market than looking at, say, the 
unemployment rate or employment 
growth alone.
The second approach provides 
more insights as well, and it turns out 
to be more useful for our purposes. Us-
ing it allows us to relate what are often 
called worker flows, which are the gross 
amount of hires or separations occur-
ring in the economy, to the employ-
ment growth (or decline) at individual 
businesses. Separations are the sum of 
all quits, layoffs, and any other type of 
separation, such as a retirement, and 
the change in a business’s employ-
ment is simply the difference between 
its total hires and total separations. 
For example, if a business hired three 
people and had one separation, its em-
ployment will have expanded by two 
jobs. Given that businesses can have 
hires while contracting and separa-
tions while expanding, one can have 
complex interactions between worker 
flows and business-level employment 
growth.  
Movements in National-Level 
Worker Flows over Time. Next, 
we need to know what the national-
level patterns of the worker flows look 
like. The Job Openings and Labor 
Turnover Survey (JOLTS) of the BLS 
reports the total amount of hiring, 
quits, and layoffs at all businesses in 
the economy each period. The data 
measure the monthly rates of total hir-
ing and total separations as a percent 
of total employment, with the latter 
broken out into quits (those who leave 
their jobs voluntarily), layoffs (those 
who are separated involuntarily), and 
other separations (e.g., retirements).3 
The JOLTS time series begins only in 
December 2000 but now covers two 
recessions. 
1 Here, “official” dates refer to the business cycle 
peaks and troughs as designated by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
2 The statistics in the Employment Situation 
Report come from two surveys: a monthly 
payroll survey, Current Employment Statistics, 
which surveys businesses about their 
employment, and a monthly household survey, 
the Current Population Survey, which queries 
households about the employment behavior of 
their members.
3 Other separations are a very small fraction of 
total separations and vary little with the busi-
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Figure 1 illustrates how the JOLTS 
aggregate estimates behave over time. 
The 2001 recession officially started 
in March and ended in November of 
that year, but employment losses (as 
measured by the BLS payroll survey) 
continued until August 2003. The 
current recession began in December 
2007. Figure 1 shows a clear decline 
in both hiring and quits during these 
downturns, suggesting that these two 
flows are procyclical; that is, they rise 
and fall in sync with economic activity. 
It also shows a very modest rise in 
layoffs during the 2001-03 period and 
a more noticeable increase in the 
2008-09 period, suggesting that layoffs 
are at least somewhat countercyclical: 
Layoffs go up when economic growth 
goes down. 
Figure 2 illustrates that other 
measures of job loss, such as the job 
destruction rate (a summary measure 
of employment losses at all contracting 
businesses) for manufacturing 
employment reported in the BLS 
Business Employment Dynamics 
(BED) data, and the Department of 
Labor’s data on initial unemployment 
insurance (UI) claims by the recently 
laid-off, provide stronger evidence 
of the countercyclicality of job loss. 
They also show that the rate of job 
loss spikes sharply during the deep 
recessions of the 1970s, 1980s, and the 
current downturn relative to the rises 
in the 1990-91 and 2001-03 periods.
How Business-Level Changes 
Relate to the National-Level Data. 
Finally, we need to know how the 
hires and separations at the business 
level aggregate to the national-level 
statistics observed in Figures 1 and 2. 
To do so, it is useful to think of the 
national-level worker flow statistics in 
Figure 1 as weighted averages of each 
worker flow rate across individual 
businesses. The key insight from the 
weighted average approach will be 
that movements in worker flows at the 
Quarterly Job Destruction and Unemployment 
Insurance Initial Claims, 1967-2009
FIGURE 2
Source: Job destruction rates are estimates for manufacturing from my working paper, updated 
through 2009 with published BED data. The UI claims rate is total weekly claims (in all sectors) 
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national level can come from one of 
two sources: changes in business-level 
worker flow rates or changes in the 
distribution of business-level activity.
For our purposes, we want to 
relate the worker flows to the business-level employment growth rates, and 
the example below illustrates the 
relationship. It splits all businesses into 
contracting, stable, and expanding 
businesses and then calculates 
the average worker flow rates and 
employment shares for each group. 
Suppose that, for a given period, 
estimates from the business-level 
micro-data provided us with the 
employment shares and worker flow 
rates shown in Table 1.
In Table 1, 25 percent of business-
es are losing workers on net, 45 percent 
have no change in their employment, 
and 30 percent are adding workers 
on net. All three groups have some 
amount of both hiring and separations 
(defined as the sum of quits and layoffs 
here). At the contracting businesses, 
the average separation rate must be 
higher than the average hiring rate 
(both measured as percentages of the 
businesses’ employment); otherwise, 
they would not be contracting. The 
opposite is true of the expanding 
businesses. At the stable businesses, 
the hiring and separation rates exactly 
offset each other. As we will see below, 
the numbers in this example are simi-
lar to what we observe in an average 
month in the U.S. data. Stable busi-
nesses have the lowest average hiring 
and separation rates because many of 
them have no employment changes at 
all in a given month.
Putting the data in our example 
together, we get the following formulas 
for deriving what the national-level 
hiring and separation rates will be in 
this case:
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(Hires/Employment) 2.0 1.0 12.0
Average Quit Rate
(Quits/Employment) 4.0 0.5 2.0
Average Layoff Rate
(Layoffs/Employment) 7.0 0.5 1.0
TABLE 1
National-Level Hiring Rate =
(0.25)(2.0)+(0.45)(1.0)+(0.30)(12.0)
= 4.550 percent
National-Level Quit Rate =
(0.25)(4.0)+(0.45)(0.5)+(0.30)(2.0)
= 1.825 percent
National-Level Layoff Rate =
(0.25)(7.0)+(0.45)(0.5)+(0.30)(1.0)
= 2.275 percent
In each case, we see that the national-
level estimates average across the 
hiring or separation rates of the 
three groups using their share of 
total employment as a weight. The 
difference between the national-level 
hiring rate (4.55 percent) and the 
national-level quit and layoff rates 
(1.825+2.275 = 4.10 percent) implies 
that total employment grew, on net, 
by 0.45 percent. Just as it is in the 
actual JOLTS data, this is a much 
smaller number than the 4.55 percent 
of workers who were just hired this 
month. 
Now, if we were to expand our 
example to include finer growth rate 
intervals (e.g., businesses that grow 
or contract less than 1 percent, 1 
to 2 percent, etc.), we would get the 
following formula:
                                      
where WFt is the national-level 
worker flow rate (i.e., hiring, quits, 
or layoffs) in period t, sgt is the share 
of employment at businesses with a 
growth rate of g in period t, and wfgt 
is the average worker flow rate for 
businesses with a growth rate of g in 
period t. Thus, the weighted average 
expression shows that movements in 
worker flows at the national level can 
come from either changes in business-
level worker flows (i.e., changes in 
wfgt) or changes in the distribution of 
business-level employment growth (i.e., 





Figures 3 and 4 illustrate what 
the “real-world” equivalents of the 
business-level worker flow rates, 
the wfgt, look like. The figures show 
estimates of the average hiring, quit, 
and layoff rates as a function of the 
business-level employment growth 
rate built from the JOLTS business-
level micro-data in my paper with 
Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger. 
Figure 3 shows that the hiring rate 
rises proportionately with the growth 
rate when growth is positive and 20   Q2  2010 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
is essentially flat when growth is 
negative. Figure 4 shows that the layoff 
rate increases proportionately with 
the size of a contraction when growth 
is negative but layoffs are essentially 
flat when growth is positive. It also 
shows that the quit rate increases 
when a contraction is relatively small 
and that quits are essentially constant 
(albeit at a higher rate) during larger 
contractions. Like the layoff rate, the 
quit rate is essentially flat when growth 
is positive. Comparing Figures 3 and 4, 
we see that the hiring and layoff rates 
at the business level exhibit opposing 
“hockey-stick” patterned relationships 
to business-level growth.
The two figures tell us that when 
a business expands employment by, 
say, 10 percent, it tends to do so with 
a hiring rate of 13.5 percent because, 
on average, 2.5 percent of its workforce 
will quit and another 1 percent will 
be either laid off or discharged as it 
tries to expand. Similarly, when a 
business wants to contract by, say, 10 
percent, it will lay off only 5 percent 
of its workforce because, on average, 
7.9 percent will leave, of which the 
business will replace 2.9 percent, on 
average, to counteract some of the 
turnover.
Figure 5 shows how the shares 
of employment at businesses with 
different growth rates, the sgt terms, 
change over time by showing the 
business-level employment growth 
rate distribution at two points: 
one for a period of high national-
level employment growth (i.e., an 
expansion) and one for a period of 
low national-level employment growth 
(i.e., a recession). As the economy 
moves from expansion to recession, 
the distribution shifts to the left, 
meaning that the sgt shares for growing 
establishments go down and the sgt 
shares for contracting establishments 
go up. While the shift may appear 
subtle, the statistics listed in the figure 
Hiring vs. Business-Level Growth
FIGURE 3
Source: Estimates from my study with Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger, which uses establish-
ment micro-data from JOLTS pooled over 2001-2006. The dashed line represents a 45-degree 
line emanating from the origin.
Separations (by Type) vs. Business-Level Growth
FIGURE 4
Source: Estimates from my study with Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger, which uses establish-
ment micro-data from JOLTS pooled over 2001-2006.
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show that the changes for businesses 
with high growth or large contractions 
are substantial. Moving from an 
expansion period to a recession period 
reduces the share of employment at 
businesses with high growth (greater 
than 10 percent of employment) from 
18.7 percent to 14.1 percent. This 
reduction corresponds to changes that 
affect roughly 6.2 million workers. 
Figure 5 also shows that the shift 
in the distribution is asymmetric: 
The shift skews the distribution of 
employment away from a small range 
of expanding businesses and toward a 
broad range of contracting businesses. 
Figure 5 shows that when moving from 
expansion to recession, the fraction of 
employment at high-growth businesses 
falls 4.6 percent, while the fraction of 
employment at businesses with a large 
contraction rises 6.3 percent. 
Finally, it turns out that the 
worker flow rates depicted in Figures 
3 and 4 barely change over time, as 
my research with Steven Davis and 
John Haltiwanger shows.4 Therefore, 
the movements in the national-level 
worker flows observed in Figure 1 
occur primarily through the shifts in 
the growth rate distribution depicted 
in Figure 5.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CYCLICAL 
EMPLOYMENT CHANGES
The fact that the growth rate 
distribution tends to have an asymmet-
ric shift when moving into a recession 
is an important reason some recessions 
are driven by relatively high job loss, 
while others are driven by relatively 
weak hiring. The example in Table 2 
shows how an asymmetric shift toward 
contracting businesses can produce a 
modest drop in the national-level hir-
ing rate but a considerable increase in 
the national-level separation rate. 
Suppose the economy from the 
previous example falls into recession, 
causing the growth rate distribution to 
shift to the left. Assume that the shift 
is asymmetric, just as it is in Figure 5. 
In the example in Table 2, the 
fraction of employment at declining 
businesses rises by 10 percentage 
points, while the fraction of 
employment at growing businesses falls 
by 5 percentage points. The difference 
is made up by a 5-percentage-point 
fall in the fraction of employment at 
stable businesses. We assume that the 
business-level hiring and separation 
rates are the same as before, consistent 
with what we find in the data. Recall 
that the previous shares of employment 
at contracting, stable, and expanding 
businesses produced a hiring rate 
of 4.55 percent, a quit rate of 1.825 
percent, and a layoff rate of 2.275 
percent at the national level. With the 
new employment shares, national-level 
hiring and separation rates are now:
National-Level Hiring Rate =
(0.35)(2.0)+(0. 40)(1.0)+(0.25)(12.0) 
= 4.10 percent
National-Level Quit Rate =
(0.35)(4.0)+(0.40)(0.5)+(0.25)(2.0)
= 2.10 percent
National-Level Layoff Rate  =
(0.35)(7.0)+(0.40)(0.5)+(0.25)(1.0)
= 2.90 percent
As the economy moves from 
expansion to recession, the hiring rate 
falls from 4.55 to 4.10 percent and the 
separation rate rises from 4.10 to 5.00 
percent. As a result, the national-level 
employment growth rate moves from 
+0.45 to -0.90 percent. The labor 
market is now contracting rather 
The Distribution of Business-Level
Employment Growth
FIGURE 5
Source: Estimates from my study with Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger, and Ian Rucker, which 
uses quarterly establishment-level growth rates from BED micro-data from 2001-2006.















13.2% during high-growth qtrs.
   19.5% during low-growth qtrs.
Employment at Large 
Contractions (< –10%):
   
18.7% during high-growth qtrs.
Employment at Large 
Expansions (> 10%):
   14.1% during low-growth qtrs.
4 In the data, the exception is the quit rate 
relationship in Figure 4, which shifts down 
during recessions.22   Q2  2010 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
sharply. Moreover, the change is driven 
more by the rise in the separation rate 
(+0.90 percent), particularly the layoff 
rate (+0.63 percent), than by the fall 
in the hiring rate (-0.45 percent).5 
Thus, our example produces the same 
result we find in the data: Severe 
recessions have relatively high layoff 
rates, more so than low hiring rates, at 
the national level.
Besides the asymmetric shift, 
the other reason our example is able 
to generate large layoffs during a 
deep recession is that it assumes that 
the hiring and layoff rates exhibit 
the “hockey-stick” relationships we 
observe in Figures 3 and 4. Since 
the layoff rate rises sharply with the 
size of a business’s contraction, larger 
leftward shifts in the growth rate 
distribution, that is, larger increases 
in the share of businesses experienc-
ing a large contraction, will drive the 
national-level layoff rate even higher. 
Figure 6 illustrates this phenomenon 
with a hypothetical interaction of the 
business-level layoff rate with move-
ments in the growth rate distribution. 
The further the growth rate distribu-
tion shifts to the left, the greater is the 
share of employment at businesses with 
very high layoff rates. This causes the 
national-level layoff rate to increase 
sharply. Since the shift in the growth 
rate distribution is asymmetric, the rise 
in the layoff rate is greater than the 
decline in the hiring rate. In contrast, 
a mild recession has a relatively small 
shift to the left, meaning that there is 
only a small increase in the share of 
businesses with very high layoff rates, 
and consequently, the asymmetry plays 
less of a role. In this case a rise in the 
national-level layoff rate may be similar 
to, or even smaller than, the decline in 
the hiring rate.
Intuitively, a mild recession means 
that there is a relatively large share 
of businesses cutting their workforces 
modestly. Figure 4 shows that such 
businesses generally do so with an 
equal mix of quits and layoffs. Since 
the contraction is small, a business 
can use regular attrition to shrink 
its employment and will have to lay 
off only a few additional workers, on 
average. At the same time, however, 
these businesses are not hiring, so 
those workers that do lose their jobs 
find it difficult to find new work and 
remain unemployed for some time. A 
deep recession involves an increase 
in the share of businesses undergoing 
large contractions. Figure 4 shows that, 
in these cases, attrition is not enough 
to get businesses to their new desired 
employment levels, so they must let 
sizable fractions of their workforces 
go, adding to the unemployment rolls 
through these layoffs.
The recessions of the 1970s and 
1980s had sharp, deep declines in 
employment. While we do not have 
data on business-level growth distribu-
tions that go back that far, our exercise 
and the large spikes in job destruction 
and UI claims observed during these 
periods (Figure 2) suggest that these 
periods likely involved large leftward 
shifts of the distribution.6  The rise in 
unemployment during these periods 
was driven by the large number of 
workers who lost their jobs as a result 
of these layoffs. The 1990-91 recession 
and the 2001 recession had relatively 
modest declines in employment, sug-
gesting that these periods involved 
much smaller shifts in the growth rate 
distribution. As our exercise would 
imply, these periods saw only mod-
est rises in the layoff rate. In relative 
terms, there was a decline in hiring 
that was just as important during 
these periods. Without a large spike in 
layoffs, the unemployment rate did not 
rise as much as it did in the 1970s and 
1980s. Both recessions, however, were 
followed by “jobless recoveries,” dur-
ing which hiring remained depressed 
for an extended period. During this 
time, it was difficult for those who did 
lose their jobs to find new work, and 
















6 The two studies by Steven Davis and John 
Haltiwanger find similar spikes in job destruc-
tion during these periods.
5 The quit rate rises in this example, contradict-
ing its behavior in Figure 1, because, for simplic-
ity, I have assumed away the fact that the quit 
relationship in Figure 4 is the only one of the 
three that changes (by shifting down) during a 
recession. This does not affect the main point of 
the example, though.remained elevated for some time.
By historical standards, the cur-
rent recession is very deep, and the 
pace of layoffs is comparable to that 
seen in the 1970s and 1980s. Conse-
quently, it likely represents a large left-
ward shift of the growth rate distribu-
tion. Through the end of 2009, a high 
layoff rate led to a sharp increase in 
the unemployment rate, but as Figure 
1 shows, there has also been a sharp 
drop in hiring.
The exercise in this article, 
though, speaks only to the severity of 
a recession, not to its length, which is 
generally determined by the nature 
of the macroeconomic shocks to 
the economy that cause a recession. 
Historically, deep recessions have been 
relatively brief (i.e., have a “V-shaped” 
recovery), implying that the growth 
rate distribution shifts to the left for a 
short period of time and then quickly 
begins shifting back toward the right, 
while the more shallow recessions have 
extended periods of job loss (i.e., have 
an “L-shaped” recovery), implying that 
the distribution shifts to the left and 
remains there for a while. 
As of this writing, the current 
recession could have either a V-shaped 
or L-shaped recovery. Under the first 
scenario, the growth rate distribu-
tion would shift sharply to the left but 
then revert relatively quickly, creat-
ing a large but brief spike in layoffs 
and a subsequent sharp, but similarly 
brief, rise in the unemployment rate. 
Under the second and more troubling 
scenario, the growth rate distribution 
would shift to the left and remain 
there for some time. Layoff rates 
would remain high and hiring would 
remain depressed, leading to very high 
unemployment rates that persist for 
some time.
CONCLUSION
A weak labor market is the out-
come of two different types of employ-
ment adjustment: weaker hiring and 
greater job loss. This article has shown 
that the severity of a recession deter-
mines whether high job loss or weak 
hiring will be the more important 
source of declining employment and 
rising unemployment through asym-
metric shifts in the distribution of busi-
ness-level employment growth. These 
shifts interact with kinked “hockey 
stick” relationships between hiring, 
layoffs, and business-level growth to 
generate this result. Therefore, an 
important part of understanding the 
behavior of employment and the pri-
mary causes of unemployment during 
an economic downturn is understand-
ing how the employment behavior of 
individual businesses changes over the 
business cycle. B R
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An Illustration of the Interaction Between Growth 
Distribution and Employer Flow Functions
FIGURE 6
Note: Figure is a hypothetical illustration of the interaction between the business-level employ-
ment growth rate distribution (Figure 5) and the layoff rate (Figure 4). The shift in the distribu-
tion is exaggerated for illustrative purposes.
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